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LANDLORD VIOLATED THE FAIR
HOUSING ACT BY USING A
RACIAL QUOTA PLAN TO
MAINTAIN INTEGRATED
HOUSING
Landlords may no longer use racial quotas to
maintain integration in housing complexes. On
March 1, 1988, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in United
States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096 (2nd
Cir. 1988), that landlords who restrict minority
access through permanent racial quotas violate
Title VIII of The Civil Rights Act of 1968 ("Fair
Housing Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 3601-3631 (1982). The
court concluded that such quotas were a violation of the Fair Housing Act regardless of the
landlord's motivation to maintain racial integration.
Background
Appellants, Starrett City Associates, built,
owned and operated in Brooklyn, New York, the
largest housing development in the nation.
Since 1973, Starrett sought to maintain a tenant
distribution of 64% White, 22% Black, and 8%
Hispanic in order to create a racially integrated
community. Starrett claimed that these quotas
were necessary to prevent "white flight" which
occurs when white tenants move out of a neighborhood once minority tenants move in. Starrett
developed a rental procedure which required
applicants for apartments to indicate their race
or national origin on an application card. Starrett placed these applications in an "active" file
and notified applicants of a vacancy when a
tenant of the same race moved out. Only then
were prospective applicants offered apartments.
In December, 1979, a group of black applicants brought an action against Starrett in federal court. Arthur v. Starrett City Assocs., 98
F.R.D. 500 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). The complaint alleged
that Starrett's quota system violated federal and
state law by discriminating against the applicants
on the basis of race. The parties ultimately
agreed to a settlement, and a consent decree
was subsequently entered by the district court.
The consent decree provided for increased
apartment availability for minorities.
The government filed suit against Starrett in
June, 1984, to address the legality of Starrett's
policy and practice of limiting the number of
apartments available to minorities in order to
maintain a racial balance. United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 605 F.Supp. 262, 263 (E.D.N.Y.
1985). The complaint alleged that Starrett violated the Fair Housing Act by discriminating
against minorities. The alleged discrimination
included forcing black applicants to wait longer
than white applicants for apartments, enforcing

a policy which preferred white applicants over
minority applicants, and falsely representing to
minorities that no apartments were available
when in fact units were available. Starrett then
moved to dismiss the suit based on estoppel,
arguing that because the government had not
intervened in the Arthur suit it could not sue
Starrett now. The district court denied the motion.
Both parties moved for summary judgment.
The district court granted the government's
motion, concluding that Starrett's practices were
clear violations of the Fair Housing Act. The Fair
Housing Act prohibits discrimination on the
basis of race, color, or national origin in the sale
or rental of housing by: 1) refusing to rent or
make available housing; 2) offering discriminatory terms of rental; 3) publishing any notice
that indicates discrimination against a protected
class; and 4) falsely representing the unavailability of housing to protected classes. The court
accordingly enjoined Starrett from discriminating against applicants on the basis of race. The
court required Starrett to adopt nondiscriminatory selection standards subject to court approval and retained jurisdiction over the parties for
three years. Starrett appealed.
Starrett's Use of a Quota System to Promote
Integration Held Discriminatory
The UnitedStates Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed the lower court by holding that the Fair Housing Act does not allow
permanent racial quotas which restrict minority
access. The court noted that discriminatory
housing practices are unlawful under the Fair
Housing Act whether they are motivated by a
racially discriminatory purpose or have a disproportionate effect on minorities. The court
summarized the purpose of the Fair Housing
Act:to provide, within constitutional limitations,
for fair housing throughout the United States.
Because the legislative history provided no guidance on the use of quotas, the court looked to
analogous federal anti-discrimination law to
determine what constituted permissible raceconscious affirmative action under the Fair Housing Act. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42
U.S.C. §2000e-2000e(17) (1982), an act with parallel objectives to the Fair Housing Act, provided a
framework for the court's discussion of racial
quotas.
Applying Title VII precedent, the court emphasized that a race-conscious affirmative action
plan may be valid under the Fair Housing Act if
the plan is temporary, has a defined goal, is
based on a history of racial discrimination, and is
designed to increase minority access. Starrett's
plan was unlawful because the quotas were
imposed indefinitely, and were not based upon

any history of prior, racial discrimination.
Further, the system acted as a ceiling for minority
access to housing opportunities.
The court concluded that Starrett's allocation
of public housing on the basis of racial quotas
clearly had a discriminatory effect on minorities.
Starrett conceded the discriminatory effect of its
plan but had two major defenses. First, Starrett
argued that it was clothed with governmental
authority by its receipt of federal funding and
thus was obligated to affirmatively promote
integration. The court declined to decide
whether Starrett was a state actor but concluded
that even if Starrett were a state actor, the racial
quotas Starrett used were invalid affirmative
action plans under the Fair Housing Act.
Starrett next argued that a "white flight" phenomenon justified its use of racial quotas to
maintain integration. In support of this argument, Starrett relied upon Otero v. New York
City Housing Authority, 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir.
1973), where the court held that public housing
authorities had a duty to integrate housing
complexes and to prevent racial segregation
even if their actions in so doing prevented some
minorities from residing in particular housing.
In Otero, the landlords rented half of a group of
newly renovated apartments to non-former occupants, instead of renting to former occupants
who were predominately minorities. The court
distinguished Otero because there the renting
procedures did not involve a plan for long-term
maintenance of specified levels of integration.
The court held the Otero plan to be a single
event which did not operate as a strict racial
quota. Starrett's plan, in contrast, operated to
determine exact racial distribution on an indefinite basis.
Dissent: Use of Quotas Discriminatory Only if
They Result in Segregation
The dissent concluded that Starrett was within
the spirit of the Fair Housing Act by maintaining

UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS DETERMINES THAT
GENERAL MOTORS' BRAKING
SYSTEM WAS NOT PROVEN
DEFECTIVE
In U.S. v. General Motors Corp., 841 F.2d 400
(D.C. Cir. 1988), the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit considered a claim that General Motors Corporation ("GM") manufactured automobiles with a
defective braking system. The claim, brought
under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act ("the Act"), alleged that GM knew, or
should have known, that the braking system in

an integrated housing complex through the use
of quotas. First, the dissent disagreed with the
majority's interpretation of the purpose of the
Fair Housing Act. The Fair Housing Act was
intended to prohibit segregation, not integration. As authority for this interpretation, the dissent noted that neither the Fair Housing Act nor
its legislative history explicitly indicates whether
Congress intended to prohibit racially maintained integration. Therefore, the dissent
claimed that the Fair Housing Act was never
intended to apply to actions such as Starrett's
which maintained an integrated rather than
segregated complex. Second, the dissent relied
upon the holding in Otero, which the dissent
characterized as generally not prohibiting racial
rental quotas adopted to promote integration
under the Fair Housing Act. The dissent in fact
found the instant case easier to decide than
Otero because Starrett promoted integration
through quotas from the inception of the complex. In Otero, on the other hand, the New York
Housing Authority attempted to achieve integration by extricating itself from commitments it
had made with minority tenants. Finally, the dissent stated that public policy decisions of this
nature should be determined by the legislature
and not by the courts.
Stephanie Ferst
Editor's Note: On November 7,1988, the United
States Supreme Court denied the petition for
writ of certiorari. justice White would have
granted the writ. 57 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Nov. 7,
1988) (No. 88-82). The United States Department
of Justice, the NAACP, and the City of Chicago
have challenged a "managed integration" quota
system used by the directors of Atrium Village, a
309-apartment complex in Chicago. Their view
is that the directors violated the Fair Housing Act
by manipulating the list of rental applicants to
maintain a 50-50 balance of black and white
tenants.
its 1980 model X-cars caused premature rearwheel lock-up. The complaint further alleged
that excessive corrosion over time aggravated
that condition, and that GM violated the Act by
failing to notify the Secretary of Treasury and
failing to remedy the defect. The Court of
Appeals held that there was not a class-wide
defect and affirmed the trial court's judgment in
favor of GM.
Background
Development of the X-car by GM began in
1975. In 1978, GM engineers first obtained information indicating a potential brake problem. In
a test of GM's model X-cars, drivers registered
complaints of "premature" rear-wheel lock(continued on page 24)

